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Introduction 
 
 
2014 Quadrennial Defense Review 
Trends in US Defense Policy and Consequences for NATO 
Marco Overhaus 
Every four years the Pentagon publishes a report on the central developments and 
trends in US defense policy. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) released in early 
March 2014 is the first to include in more detail the consequences of the defense 
budget cuts passed since 2011. Otherwise, the so-called US rebalance to the Asia-Pacific 
region and the war-weariness of the American people are the principal factors shaping 
US defense policy. While not representing a watershed for transatlantic defense cooper-
ation, the trends outlined in the QDR do contain risks and potential for conflict in the 
relationship with Europe. 
 
The US defense budget is currently subject 
to two-pronged spending cutbacks. Firstly, 
the 2011 Budgetary Control Act reduces 
military spending by $487 billion over a 
period of ten years. Secondly, the same 
piece of legislation introduces the so-called 
sequester cutting an additional $50 billion 
annually, also for ten years. The sequester 
is an enforcement mechanism that remains 
in place until the President and both par-
ties in Congress reach agreement on com-
prehensive consolidation measures for the 
federal budget – in which they have not to 
date succeeded. 
Misunderstanding and Uncertainties 
These measures are surrounded by a series 
of misunderstandings. Firstly, the “cuts” 
are in fact reductions in planned future 
spending increases, rather than contrac-
tions in actual spending. Secondly, budget 
decisions are not carved in stone. Instead 
the budget is renegotiated every year. Con-
gress has in fact revoked large parts of the 
sequester-related cuts for the 2014 and 
2015 fiscal years, even though the mecha-
nism formally remains in place. 
The Department of Defense bases the 
2014 QDR on the assumption that there 
will be further cuts in the defense budget, 
but does not expect full application of the 
sequester to continue after fiscal year 2015. 
On that basis the Pentagon is pursuing an 
approach of reducing the force structure 
and size in favor of investment in moderni-
zation and key technologies, such as bal-
listic missile defense and fifth-generation 
jet fighters. The Army is hardest hit by the 
numerical reductions, with active-duty 
forces slated to fall to 440,000 or 450,000 
from the 570,000 men and women serving 
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 at the peak of the wars in Iraq and Afghani-
stan. 
Assessing the consequences of these mili-
tary cutbacks is also associated with great 
uncertainties. As well as closing bases in the 
United States, the Pentagon is also seeking 
economies in the military pay and benefits 
that today account for more than one third 
of the base defense budget. But to date Con-
gress has resolutely blocked both these 
measures. 
The Defense Department is confident 
that the United States will be able to main-
tain its global engagement, although sub-
ject to compromises involving scaling back 
military ambitions. Talk of the United States 
maintaining the capacity to conduct two 
major regional contingency operations sim-
ultaneously has ceased. Instead the QDR 
states the objective as being able to defeat 
one regional adversary (not named, but 
meaning Iran or North Korea) and at the 
same time restrain aggression by a second 
adversary in a different region. 
The American Defense Posture 
in Europe 
Developments in US defense policy may 
have repercussions on the strength of US 
forces and the number of bases it maintains 
in Europe – in military jargon its defense 
posture – and thus indirectly affect NATO. 
Over the past two decades the importance 
of permanently stationed US forces for 
transatlantic defense cooperation has 
shrunk enormously. Today there are only 
about 64,000 soldiers left under United 
States European Command (EUCOM). 
Financial imperatives increase the pres-
sure to make further reductions, especially 
where Congress would prefer to see foreign 
bases closed before domestic infrastructure 
is affected. But the QDR contains only a 
general proposal to review and adapt the 
defense posture in Europe. 
The current crisis in Ukraine again 
spotlights the political and psychological 
importance of an American presence in 
Europe. In response to the crisis the United 
States has moved additional F-16 fighters 
to Poland and also temporarily bolstered its 
air force presence in Lithuania. For its allies 
in central and eastern Europe, any reduc-
tion in the US presence in Europe repre-
sents a loss capable of provoking strong 
political reactions in the Atlantic Alliance. 
For NATO’s military capability on the 
other hand, the number of US troops per-
manently stationed in Europe is of second-
ary importance. Even under the more dras-
tic scenario of sequester cuts the United 
States is not going to relinquish its capacity 
to project power in Africa and the Middle 
East via its European bases. 
The military forces required for NATO 
crisis management remain available even if 
troops permanently stationed in Europe are 
replaced by rotating units – a trend that is 
already clearly apparent in connection with 
the NATO Response Force (NRF). For the first 
time Washington now wishes to contribute 
its own forces to the NRF, but these are units 
based in the United States that would only 
be moved to Europe temporarily as needed 
for deployment or training purposes. 
The greatest risks relate to the ability of 
the United States and Europe to preserve 
the interoperability gained in Afghanistan 
by means of joint training and exercises in 
Europe. If Congress blocks cuts in “military 
pay and benefits,” the savings will have to 
come at the expense of funds for operations 
and exercises instead. As a consequence 
NATO could also be forced to prune its am-
bitious program of training and exercises. 
Joint Operations 
Under conditions of budgetary constraints 
the United States will have to be more selec-
tive in its global commitments. One signifi-
cant restriction relates to the conduct of 
lengthy stabilization and counter-insurgen-
cy operations. 
In future the United States will have to 
rely more on a “light footprint,” in the sense 
of a combination of intelligence activities, 
drone operations and special operations, 
together with provision of training and 
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 equipment for security actors in third 
states. The increase in Special Operations 
Forces (SOF) from 66,000 to almost 70,000 
proposed in the 2014 QDR, while the other 
military branches suffer significant cut-
backs, underlines this tendency toward to 
a “light military footprint.” The shift offers 
both chances and risks for transatlantic 
defense cooperation. 
Training armed forces in partner coun-
tries is a significant task of the so-called 
“white” SOFs. This is one of the operational 
areas where the United States wishes to step 
up its engagement. Here there is potential 
for greater collaboration with Europe, 
where for example the European Union’s 
“Enable and Enhance Initiative” (E2I) under 
the Common Security and Defense Policy 
proposes similar priorities. 
On the other hand, the activities of the 
“black” SOFs, which encompass “direct 
action,” create potential for conflict. This 
type of operations, which include prepar-
ing and conducting precision strikes 
against terrorists and their infrastructure, 
remains politically and legally highly con-
troversial in Europe – not least so in Ger-
many. 
The QDR of March 2014 remains vague 
about the details of the light footprint, and 
especially the relationship between “black” 
and “white” SOFs. But after more than ten 
years of “war on terror” US special forces 
are strongly orientated on direct action. 
That is also of immediate relevance for 
NATO, which has established its own spe-
cial operations headquarters intended to 
help improve the interoperability of the 
SOFs of NATO member-states. 
Transatlantic Defense Projects 
The general thrust of the QDR 2014 – 
reducing the size of the armed forces 
in order to protect central procurement 
projects and technologies from spending 
cuts – also creates chances and risks for 
transatlantic cooperation. 
The QDR does not call into question the 
most expensive programs, such as NATO 
missile defense and the F-35 Joint Strike 
Fighter (JSF). Alongside the United States, as 
the main partner, six other NATO members 
are involved in the JSF program: the United 
Kingdom, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey, 
Denmark, and Norway. With respect to the 
development of missile defense, however, it 
can be expected that the US Congress will 
increase the pressure on Europe to make a 
larger material contribution. 
As well as the perennial issue of burden-
sharing, the increasing US focus on technol-
ogy, as reflected in the QDR, is associated 
with additional risks for the transatlantic 
relationship. The United States will increas-
ingly invest in technologies designed to 
maintain its capabilities, also in view of 
the growing military challenge of China. 
Alongside missile defense this means sub-
marine warfare, the development of long-
range anti-ship missiles, and autonomous 
unmanned systems (drones), as well as new 
technologies to intensify control of space 
and cyberspace. 
It is in the growing importance of these 
technologies that the actual relevance to 
Europe of the US rebalance to Asia actually 
lies, rather than questions such as the num-
ber of navy vessels deployed to the Pacific. 
Many of the areas listed are not defense 
policy priorities for European NATO mem-
bers or are politically highly controversial. 
Therein lies a risk of opening up new “tech-
nology gaps” between the United States and 
Europe, and the danger of Atlantic security 
policy priorities drifting further apart. 
Outlook 
The QDR of March 2014 again underlines 
the American claim to global leadership – 
including by military means. But beyond 
that, there are many imponderables in the 
future of US defense policy. 
Currently there are no radical reductions 
in transatlantic defense cooperation in pros-
pect. But risks remain. Budgetary constraints 
call into question the expansion of joint 
training and exercise activities desired by 
NATO. The US military’s turn to a light foot-
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 print offers, on the one hand, an oppor-
tunity to intensify cooperation within 
NATO and with the European Union in 
establishing security structures in Africa 
and elsewhere. On the other hand, there 
is at the same time a heightened risk of 
conflict over the issue of US special forces 
involvement in direct strikes against terror-
ists. The increasing shift in priorities away 
from land forces and toward technology-
intensive investment in air and naval forces 
in the course of the “rebalance to Asia” cre-
ates further procurement and security chal-
lenges for the transatlantic relationship. 
Germany and the other European NATO 
allies should make concrete plans for deal-
ing with these challenges. In their relation-
ship with the United States, the Alliance 
partners should also expand those areas 
where the concrete priorities identifiable 
in the 2014 QDR fit with German and Euro-
pean interests. This applies in particular to 
European contributions to preserving inter-
operability through joint military exercises, 
more of which could also be held in the 
United States, and to developing the capac-
ities of security actors in third states, not 
least in Africa. 
© Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik, 2014 
All rights reserved 
These Comments reflect  
solely the author’s views. 
SWP 
Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik 
German Institute for 
International and  
Security Affairs 
Ludwigkirchplatz 3­4 
10719 Berlin 
Telephone  +49 30 880 07-0 
Fax  +49 30 880 07-100 
www.swp-berlin.org 
swp@swp-berlin.org 
ISSN 1861-1761 
Translation by Meredith Dale 
(English version of 
SWP-Aktuell 12/2014) 
SWP Comments 14 
March 2014 
4 
